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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State, in its Respondent's Brief, has conceded that it was error for the district 
court to modify the underlying terms of Mr. Bosier's probation so that his probation 
would commence at a later date than that indicated in his original judgment of conviction 
and sentence wherein Mr. Bosier was originally placed on probation. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.9 n.1.) Therefore, the only remaining issue for this Court's 
resolution is whether the district court lacked the authority to also alter Mr. Bosier's 
underlying judgment of conviction and sentence so that his underlying sentence for 
possession of a controlled substance would run consecutively to his sentences arising 
from Canyon County. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the remaining contentions of the State 
regarding the district court's alteration to Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Bosier's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court lack jurisdiction in this case to alter Mr. Bosier's underlying 
sentence upon remand from the ldaho Court of Appeals specifically directing the 
district court to reinstate "the original probation" as ordered in Mr. Bosier's 
original judgment of conviction and sentence? 
2. Did the district court err when it increased the aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's 
sentence through filing an amended judgment of conviction and sentence when 
the ldaho Court of Appeals did not vacate Mr. Bosier's original judgment of 
conviction and sentence? 
3. Did the district court impose a vindictive sentence when it increased the 
aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and sentence upon 
Mr. Bosier's successful appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction In This Case To Alter Mr. Bosier's Underlving 
Sentence Upon Remand From The ldaho Court Of Appeals Specifically Directing The 
District Court To Reinstate "The Original Probation" As Ordered In Mr. Bosier's Original 
Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence 
In response to Mr. Bosier's assertion that the district court exceeded the scope of 
its jurisdiction upon remand, and therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take 
action in the form of altering Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and sentence, the State 
makes two primary arguments. First, the State asserts that Mr. Bosier has not provided 
"authority for the proposition that the issue of a court exceeding its authority on remand 
is a jurisdictional issue." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Second, the State asserts that the 
district court had the authority to alter the original judgment of conviction and sentence 
because doing so was only addressing a matter previously overlooked by the district 
court at Mr. Bosier's original sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) The State's 
assertions, however, lack merit. 
Although the State argues that Mr. Bosier failed to present legal authority in 
support of his assertion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to alter 
Mr. Bosier's underlying judgment of conviction and sentence, which was left intact by 
the Court of Appeals' prior Opinion in Mr. Bosier's case, this argument ignores the legal 
authorities already presented in Mr. Bosier's Appellant's Brief. The ldaho Supreme 
Court in State v. Hosey, which was one of the cases relied on by Mr. Bosier, expressly 
referred the determination of the district court's authority to take action upon remand of 
a case as one of "the trial court's jurisdiction on remand." State v. Hosey, 134 ldaho 
883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000) (see also Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) The Opinion 
in Hummer v. Evans, also relied upon in the Appellant's Brief, makes this point even 
more clear - it is the language of the remittitur that directs whether the district court 
retains any continuing and vested subject matter jurisdiction in a case. Hummer V. 
Evans, 132 ldaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999). If the directive of the 
appellate court is merely to enter a judgment - or, as in this case, reinstate the original 
judgment of conviction and order of probation -then this is merely a ministerial task that 
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district court to litigate or make 
substantive alterations outside of the directive of the appellate court. Id. (see also 
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
Mr. Bosier further relied both on the cases of Sfate v. Rogers and Sfafe v. 
Jakoski in support of his jurisdictional argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Both of 
these opinions provide that, "Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial 
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment 
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment 
on appeal." Sfate v. Rogers, 140 ldaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004); State v. 
Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, 
the ldaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, which was also relied upon by 
Mr. Bosier in his Appellant's Brief, extensively analyzed and determined that the above 
quoted holding represented a statement of limitation specifically on the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the district court. Stafe v. Armstrong, 146 ldaho 372, 377-378, 195 P.3d 
731, 736-737 (Ct. App. 2008) (see also Appellant's Brief, p.7). Given this, the State's 
claim that Mr. Bosier has provided "no authority for the proposition that the issue of a 
court exceeding its authority on remand is a jurisdictional issue" is without merit. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
The State's alternative argument is that the district court, in altering Mr. Bosier's 
underlying sentence, was merely effectuating the district court's original intent and 
providing for an absent term. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-11.) These arguments fail for 
two reasons. First, the State cites to no evidence in the record in support of any 
indication of the district court's original intent at sentencing; and the record actually 
discloses that the district court had earlier held the opposite intent. But, more important 
for this Court, the State is wrong in its suggestion that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence 
was not altered, as the default position by statute in Idaho is that a sentence ordered 
into execution is sewed concurrently to a prior sentence unless the district court 
expressly orders the sentence to run consecutively. 
With regard to the State's post-hoc postulation as to the district court's intent at 
sentencing, this assertion is without support in the record. The statements made by the 
district court, and relied on by the State, indicate solely the district court's present 
intention at the time of re-sentencing Mr. Bosier after he had successfully challenged 
the district court's prior action of sua sponte revoking Mr. Bosier's probation. (Tr., p.6, 
L.19 - p.7, L.5.) This new-found intention cannot be imputed retroactively to the district 
court at Mr. Bosier's original sentencing. 
Moreover, the record in this case actually demonstrates that the district court's 
initial disposition towards the Canyon County sentences was the opposite of what the 
district court eventually ordered upon remand from Mr. Bosier's prior successful appeal. 
Upon learning of Mr. Bosier's underlying sentences in the Canyon County cases after 
Mr. Bosier had been placed on probation, the district court, upon improperly revoking 
his probation, ordered that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence would "run concurrent with 
the other cases that have him in the penitentiary." (34745 Tr., p.33, ~s.16-21.') It is 
very clear that the district court intended this to include the Canyon County cases, since 
the district court explicitly referenced the Canyon County case numbers and the dates 
upon which those sentences would be completed thereafter. (34745 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-9.) 
The Amended Judgment of Conviction and Sentence ordered upon revocation of 
Mr. Bosier's probation likewise reflects the district court's disposition that his underlying 
sentence should be served "concurrently wifh aN other cases currently being senled and 
said term to commence immediately." (34547 R., p.54) (emphasis added.) While the 
prior Court of Appeals' opinion in this case vacated all but Mr. Bosier's original judgment 
of conviction and sentence, the record nevertheless reflects that the district court 
originally entertained the opposite disposition regarding whether Mr. Bosier's underlying 
sentence should be served consecutively or concurrently to those arising from Canyon 
County - and that the district court's intention only changed after Mr. Bosier's 
successful appeal. 
That being said, the intent of the district court is irrelevant, as under Idaho's 
statutory scheme a criminal sentence is presumed to commence immediately, and 
therefore be served concurrently with all other sentences for which a defendant may 
1 The prior appellate record from Mr. Bosier's previous appeal, designated ldaho 
Supreme Court Case No. 34745, has already been augmented into the record for 
Mr. Bosier's present appeal via the ldaho Supreme Court's Order Augmenting Appeal 
Record entered on June 29, 2009. (R., pp.3-4.) As such, any portions of the transcript 
or clerk's record from the prior appeal are cited to herein with reference to Mr. Bosier's 
prior Supreme Court case number. 
already be serving time unless the district court specifically orders that the sentence is 
to be served consecutively. ldaho Code section 18-309, in addition to delineating when 
a defendant is entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration, provides that a term of 
incarceration that is ordered by the district court "commences upon the pronouncement 
of sentence." I.C. § 18-309. By its plain language, the default provision for a criminal 
sentence is that it commences to be served immediately. A district court at sentencing 
does have the discretion to alter this default provision, and provide that a sentence does 
not commence to be served until a prior sentence has been satisfied. See, e.g., 
I.C. § 18-308; State v. Mead, 145 ldaho 378, 382, 179 P.3d 341, 345 (Ct. App. 2008). 
However, in absence of such a declaration, under Idaho's statutory scheme, the term of 
a defendant's sentence begins to commence upon the pronouncement and execution of 
his or her sentence by default. 
Given this, the district court's alteration of the terms and conditions of 
Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence, providing that his sentence would not begin to 
commence until after he had served his Canyon County sentences, represented a 
substantive alteration of Mr. Bosier's original judgment of conviction and sentence, and 
was further an unlawful increase of that sentence. (See R., p.12; 34745 R., p.43.) 
The District Court Erred When It Increased The Aqqreaate Term Of Mr. Bosier's 
Sentence Throuqh Filinq An Amended Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence When 
The ldaho Court Of Appeals Did Not Vacate Mr. Bosier's Original Judqment Of 
Conviction And Sentence 
While the issue of whether the district court erred by increasing Mr. Bosier's 
sentence was not separately addressed in the State's brief, the State implicitly argues 
that Mr. Bosier's sentence was not increased because he "has failed to show that he 
had the presumption of a concurrent sentence." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) Contrary to 
the State's implication, unless the district court expressly orders that a sentence shall 
run consecutively to a prior ordered sentence, the default provision in Idaho is that a 
sentence of incarceration commences to run upon entry of the judgment of conviction. 
See I.C. § 18-309 (term of incarceration "commences upon pronouncement of 
sentence"). As such, under the original terms and conditions of Mr. Bosier's underlying 
sentence, this sentence would be presumed to commence to run upon being executed 
by the district court. Additionally, as noted in the Appellant's Brief, an alteration of a 
sentence from being served concurrently with another sentence to being served 
consecutively does operate as an increase of the sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13- 
14.) Therefore, when the district court altered Mr. Bosier's original judgment of 
conviction and sentence in order to provide that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence was to 
run consecutively to his sentences arising from Canyon County, the district court 
increased the aggregate term of the sentence that was originally set forth in Mr. Bosier's 
initial judgment of conviction and sentence that was left in force by the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in this case. 
The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence When It Increased The Aqareqate 
Term Of Mr. Bosier's Judclment Of Conviction And Sentence Upon Mr. Bosier's 
Successful Appeal 
As with Mr. Bosier's other assertions on appeal, the State has responded to 
Mr. Bosier's contention that the district court sentenced him vindictively upon remand, 
and thereby abused its discretion, by asserting that the district court did not increase 
Mr. Bosier's sentence upon remand. (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The State also 
suggests that the district court was merely effectuating the court's intent at sentencing. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.12.) 
However, it is particularly salient to the issue of Mr. Bosier's vindictive sentencing 
claim to note that the district court, even after learning of Mr. Bosier's underlying 
Canyon County sentences, had originally determined that it was appropriate for 
Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence in this case to run concurrently with his sentences 
from Canyon County. (34745 Tr., p.33, L.16 - p.34, L.9; 34745 R., p.54.) It is also 
apparent from the record, and the State does not dispute, that the only new information 
that was before the district court when it attempted to resentence Mr. Bosier upon 
remand was the fact that Mr. Bosier had successfully appealed the district court's prior 
action of sua sponte revoking his probation. (Tr., p.1, Ls.3-25.) As such, it would 
appear that the district court affirmatively altered its position regarding whether 
Mr. Bosier's sentence should be served consecutively or concurrently to his sentences 
arising out of Canyon County, not that the district court had originally intended to order 
these sentences to run consecutively from the outset. And the district court's position 
only changed upon Mr. Bosier's prior successful challenge on appeal in this case. 
Moreover, as has been previously noted, the default provision in Idaho is that a 
sentence begins to be served immediately upon execution, and that the district court 
must exercise its discretion by affirmatively ordering a sentence to run consecutive to a 
prior sentence in order to disturb the default provision. I.C. §§ 18-308, 18-309; see also 
Points I & 11, supra. Given this, the district court imposed a vindictive sentence when it 
increased the aggregate portion of Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence following 
Mr. Bosier's successful appeal of the revocation of his probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bosier respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's Third 
Amended Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence, and remand this 
case with instructions to the district court to re-instate Mr. Bosier on probation under his 
original Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence that was entered by 
the district court on October 5, 2007. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2010. 
SARAH E. TOMP~INS-) 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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